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The Honorable Robert H. Henry∗ 
Jurisprudential Jedi Master (and perhaps Guitar Hero) Bryan Garner 
credits Aristotle, the great Greek trinitarian (small “t”), with a 
surprisingly remarkable invention: the realization that each speech has 
three parts: a beginning (or introduction), a middle, and an end.2  This is 
the beginning. 
I. THE BEGINNING 
In this section I shall do three things.  First, I will thank my hosts, the 
Dean and her fine law school.  Second, I will acknowledge the donor—
the Founder of our Feast—one of our Circuit’s fine law firms.  Third, 
and finally, as far as the beginning goes, I will tell you what I plan to 
cover in the middle of my speech, which also has three parts.  To the 
task! 
First, I do indeed want to thank Dean Agrawal for her kind 
introduction, but more for her risk-taking in inviting me to present this 
inaugural lecture.  This is a good month and year for inaugurations, and I 
just came from a rather expansive one in Washington, D.C.  In the press 
release announcing this fine center on advocacy, your dean made several 
perceptive statements which bridge gaps and bear repeating now.  She 
said: 
Much ink has been spilled about the divide between the practicing bar 
and the legal academy . . . .  While I don’t join the chorus of those who 
lament the relationship between the educational and the practicing arms 
of our profession, I do agree that our shared profession is stronger when 
                                                     
 * Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  Eschew the use of 
footnotes for substantive matter in persuasive writing at all costs!  I am using them here because this 
is a law review essay, and thus I need citations of authority, as well as diversions, to occupy the 
particularly rigid realm of legal journal writing.  As to the meaning of this title, the reader should 
decide.  Presumably, overcoming advocacy is better than regular ol’ advocacy, and overcoming 
advocacy might also include the kind of “ethical” rhetoric that lawyer advocates, being officers of 
the court, should provide. 
 2. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER ON LANGUAGE AND WRITING 4 (2009).  Or as the Greeks 
would say, the prooemium, the prothesis, and the epilogos. 
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we create opportunities to work together on the preparation of the next 
generation of lawyers, law professors and judges.  It is an important 
task—perhaps one of the most crucial ones we undertake—that none of 
us can do alone. . . .  The center will create not a physical, but an 
intellectual space for an ongoing dialogue and shared teaching mission 
between the KU law school and practicing lawyers.3 
I will return to these sentiments a bit later, but I fully embrace them 
now.  Legal advocacy, and the ethics that must accompany it, requires 
both the academy and the bar to teach and foster.  Dean, I commend you 
and the Law School for this endeavor. 
Second, I want to acknowledge the donors who made this center 
possible.  Shook, Hardy, & Bacon, L.L.P. is a very prominent law firm.  
One of the things I most admire about it is its dedication to the profession 
through providing pro bono services.  The legal community notices such 
things.  Indeed, the firm has a full-time director of pro bono activities 
and an active pro bono committee.  Its charity and success have been 
noted; I know that the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center has honored 
the firm for its pro bono efforts in this most difficult field, dealing with, 
as the Torah puts it, “the stranger that dwelleth with you.”4  This ethical 
commitment to represent those who cannot obtain or afford 
representation, especially those that may have very difficult cases, 
reflects the overall ideal that every sincere and serious litigant—rich or 
poor, unpopular or acclaimed, deserves representation—an ideal perhaps 
once more popular and practiced than it is now. 
Also, as this Center for Excellence in Advocacy evidences, the firm 
actively acknowledges that ethics requires that lawyers should be good 
advocates, and know how to write and speak professionally.  They are 
right; the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explain why we are here: 
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”5  Competent 
representation requires not only following court rules for format, content,  
 
                                                     
 3. Press Release, Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Law, New Law Sch. Ctr. to Promote Excellence in 
Legal Advocacy (June 13, 2008), http://www.law.ku.edu/media/news/stories/2008 
/center_for_excellence.shtml (emphasis added). 
 4. Leviticus 19:34 (King James); see also ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 630 
(2004) (“Like the native among you shall be the sojourner who sojourns with you . . . .”). 
 5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). 
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page length, and appendices; it also requires an ability in advocacy.6  
Thus, advocacy that is not competent violates these model rules. 
Now, as promised, I come to the end of the beginning, where I will 
tell you what I hope follows.  Our subject today is advocacy, and 
presumably includes what it is and how to use it, how to create advocacy 
that overcomes, and how to overcome opposing advocacy. 
We know that as lawyers we advocate for those interests we 
represent, but we often forget to whom our advocacy is directed and do 
not take into account our audience and how to persuade it.  This is one of 
the greatest mistakes I see in appellate advocacy and, as I will later 
discuss, I am not alone. 
I am going to start with the Greeks (Aristotle in particular) and 
explain why I think we should look to them in creating “overcoming” 
advocacy that persuades your audience.  Second, and Aristotle would be 
happy with this, I want to talk about some of the ethics inherent in legal 
advocacy, which will show why the Dean was right, and must be right in 
her remark that I quoted earlier.7 
II. THE MIDDLE: “[I]T WAS GREEK TO ME.”8 
In my view, the art of professional legal advocacy is best understood 
as being virtually synonymous with what Aristotle termed the “art of 
rhetoric.”  Aristotle’s Rhetoric, written over 2300 years ago, is still 
considered to be the first, and perhaps the middle and last, word on the 
topic.  The book itself is a hard read, probably because it is a community 
effort—at least partially a collection of Ari’s or his students’ notes from 
his lectures on the subject, so the inmates ran the asylum.  This, coupled 
with the difficulty of translating his precise Greek terms into modern 
English, makes the reader’s task daunting without some help.  But it is a 
veritable encyclopedia of persuasion and merits review.  Perhaps 
recognizing this, some law schools have recently begun to include 
courses on rhetoric in their curricula; you can be sure these courses 
carefully examine Aristotle. 
Aristotle cleverly assumed his definition of rhetoric: “[l]et rhetoric 
be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available 
                                                     
 6. See, e.g., Thomas Haggard, Good Writing as a Professional Responsibility, 8 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 159, 159 (2002) (“Procedural rules often go beyond content and format, and 
address the required style of some pleadings.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 
(2002). 
 7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2. 
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means of persuasion.”9  The great depth of Aristotle’s coverage of the 
topic certainly exceeds my grasp and our time limitations, but I want to 
talk about his overarching theme, and the three attributes that are the 
means of persuasive advocacy. 
As I stated at the outset, Aristotle was something of a trinitarian who 
often seemed to categorize things in threes.10  Thus, he indicated that a 
speech required three things—a speaker, a subject, and an audience—and 
he labeled three kinds of public speaking, based not upon the style of the 
speech, but upon the audiences addressed.  The categories indicate 
audiences that are deliberative (like a legislature), or forensic (like a 
court or jury, or perhaps we might use the word “judicial”), and 
ceremonial (the Greek word epideictic referred to ceremonial speeches, 
such as Pericles’s famous funeral oration—the oration that greatly 
influenced Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address11). 
Another way of distinguishing his categories is temporal.  The 
deliberative speaker focuses on the future.  He or she speaks to a future 
event: vote for me, pass this bill, throw the rascals out.  In the forensic or 
judicial genera, the past is what is important.  The speaker “prosecutes or 
defends concerning what has been done.”12  In the ceremonial speech, the 
present tense is the primary and most important, “for all speakers praise 
or blame in regard to existing qualities . . . .”13 
                                                     
 9. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter Kennedy].  Professor Kennedy’s translation, extensive notes, 
and commentary provide the assistance needed to mine this classical work.  Indeed, Kennedy’s title 
shows the work for what it is: not only a discourse on the art of persuasion, but a work of 
psychological mastery that proposes a way for citizens to have the very discourse necessary for 
civilized society to exist. 
 10. E.g., Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right To Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61, 81 n.118 
(2008) (“According to Aristotle’s seminal formulation, there are three types of moral government: 
the rule of one, or monarchy; the rule of the few, or aristocracy; and the rule of the many, which we 
currently call democracy.”) (citing ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, at bk. IV (T.A. Sinclair trans., rev. ed. 
1981)); Vincent J. Samar, Can a Constitutional Amendment be Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 667, 674 (2008) (citing IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 367–68 
(Sarah Touborg ed., 13th ed. 2009)) (“These are the three laws of thought, which were probably first 
explicitly recognized by Aristotle.  They are the principle of identity, the law of contradiction, and 
law of excluded middle.”). 
 11. GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 56–59 
(1992). 
 12. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 48.  Perhaps these categories are not perfectly descriptive of 
today’s legal system which deals with remedying past events and also with correcting things moving 
forward. 
 13. Id.  Again, Pericles’s funeral oration shows this model.  The praise was for the present: the 
gallantry of those soldiers who fought the battle and died, as well as those who survived and 
gathered at the oration.  In these kinds of speeches, as Professor Kennedy notes, the “speakers 
usually praise past actions but with the intent of celebrating timeless virtues and inculcating them as 
models for the future.”  Id. at 48 n.79.  For example, “[a]nd that government of the people, by the 
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”  President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg 
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Aristotle goes on to list the primary “ends” or goals of the three types 
of speeches.  The deliberative speaker speaks in terms of what is 
advantageous versus that which is harmful; the forensic or judicial 
speaker talks of the just and unjust; the ceremonial speaker evokes the 
honorable against the shameful.14  Mixing of these goals can occur—the 
deliberative speaker may claim his view is not only advantageous to 
society, but that the contrary view is also unjust—but the primary ends 
motivate the way the speech progresses.15 
The most significant thing about Aristotle’s contribution here is not 
immediately apparent because it is seemingly so obvious.  His 
overarching theme—perhaps his greatest insight—is that one’s audience 
is key.  He is the first thinker to advance “the central idea of tailoring the 
argument to the knowledge and values of the audience.”16 
Well, duh.  Of course, the audience is important!  That is, as the 
math books said when they could not figure out how to explain a 
concept, “intuitively obvious to even the most casual observer.”  But is 
it? 
One of the greatest mistakes I see in appellate advocacy comes from 
confusion of this very point.  Who is the audience for your appellate 
brief?  It is not the jury; you won or lost that one below.  It is not the 
client or even the senior partner; they are already convinced they are 
right.  It is a judge, a very busy one with lots of work and lots on her 
mind, and a crushing need to get a lot of opinions out.  You need to craft 
your advocacy accordingly.  And, by the way, the bar is not doing too 
well at this. 
Bryan Garner reports some of his research on this matter in his new 
book Garner on Language and Writing.  His informal and admittedly 
anecdotal study is shocking: Judge Thomas Reavley, a highly respected 
jurist, put the range of helpful briefs in the Fifth Circuit at five to ten 
percent.17  Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, one of our 
most interesting judicial writers, said that it would be “extravagant to say 
that 3 [percent] of the briefs are of a high professional caliber.”18  
Another Fifth Circuit jurist, Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee, termed the brief 
                                                                                                                       
Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in WILLS, supra note 11, at 263. 
 14. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 49. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 61, 65 (2002).  Jamar’s excellent article has been singularly helpful to me in 
formulating this lecture. 
 17. GARNER, supra note 2, at xxxiii. 
 18. Id. at xxxiv. 
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writing he saw “[e]xecrable,” and then “[h]orrible.”19  Responding to 
those lawyers who say that if they adopt his writing suggestions the 
product would not be what judges expect to see, Garner says, “My 
answer is: precisely.  You don’t want to give judges what they expect.  
They expect boring word-gravel.  They expect meandering, aimless 
briefs that take seemingly forever to get through.  I say that you 
shouldn’t give judges what they expect; instead, give them a pleasant 
surprise.”20 
Given this overarching theme, that the audience is important, how do 
we persuade it?  To Aristotle there are two means of persuasion (pisteis): 
non-artistic (or extrinsic) and artistic (or intrinsic).21  Non-artistic refers 
to preexisting facts, things not provided by the speaker.  An example 
would be “witnesses, testimony of slaves taken under torture, contracts, 
and such like.”22  (I wonder if they had the torture debate then too?)  But 
important to our task are the artistic means, those embodied in the art of 
rhetoric and intrinsic in the rhetorician herself. This might be the most 
important triumvirate.  Again, they are three: first, there is the character 
of the speaker;23 second, there is ability to dispose the listener to one’s 
point of view,24 (or to cause the hearers to feel emotion, or, as Roberts 
translates, “putting the audience into a certain frame of mind”25); and 
third, there is the argument itself.26  As a means of convenience, many 
scholars refer to these as ethos, the character of the speaker; pathos, the 
emotion of the audience; and logos, not only the words but the logic and 
structure of the argument.27  Let’s briefly discuss each. 
A. Character Counts: An Advocate Should Be Fair-Minded and 
Credible 
The thought behind and contents of the speech should reveal a 
persuasive character in the speaker, presenting him or her in a 
                                                     
 19. Id. at xxxiii. 
 20. Id. at xxxiv. 
 21. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 37. 
 22. Id. 
 23. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC AND POETICS 25 (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., 
Random House 1954) [hereinafter Roberts & Bywater]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 24. 
 26. Id. at 25. 
 27. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 37–38 n.40 (discussing ethos and pathos).  The problem is 
that ethos and pathos would normally be translated as moral character and emotion, which are 
attributes of persons, not speeches.  Of course in a purely ethical world the character of the speaker 
would inform the character of the speech. 
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trustworthy light.  That is, the speaker should speak in a way of being 
“worthy of credence,”28 as some of our employment cases speak of 
employers’ motives.  Aristotle suggests that people who are thought of as 
fair-minded are more likely to be believed.  As he says, “we believe fair-
minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] 
on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not 
exact knowledge but room for doubt.”29  As one writer puts it, the 
emphasis on character is upon the speaker gaining the audience’s trust, 
and it is accomplished by “creating a psychological connection with the 
audience . . . .”30 
Aristotle is not concerned here with the reputation of the speaker, 
although we will be so concerned a bit later for reasons somewhat 
peculiar to legal advocacy.  (Perhaps his lack of concern with this is 
because in Greek trials the defendant had to speak for himself; at best he 
might have someone else write a speech for him.  He could not rely on a 
Pericles or Themistocles to present his cause.)  What Aristotle is 
speaking to is the ability of the speaker to convey his goodness and fair-
mindedness by his speech.31  Additional things, such as reputation for 
wisdom, public service, previous actions, and others would be non-
artistic or extrinsic, and so not the subject of our current inquiry.  
Aristotle parts company with some of his contemporaries here: “It is not 
true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the 
personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his 
power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called 
the most effective means of persuasion he possesses.”32 
While it is true that judges today cannot (and should not) expressly 
punish a party for an advocate’s bad character, character still contributes 
something.  Like it or not, character and argument are, as Ari notes, 
inextricably intertwined.  While a judge may not consciously assess the 
value of a brief based on the character of the lawyer, if a lawyer throws 
in ten meritless arguments and buries a good one in the middle, a judge 
                                                     
 28. Id. at 38. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Jamar, supra note 16, at 73. 
 31. The character of the speaker may be even more important in the ceremonial epideictic 
occasions that call for encomia.  In Book I, chapter nine, Aristotle lists the virtues worthy of study so 
that we can find “how to make our hearers take the required view of our own characters . . . .”  
Roberts & Bywater, supra note 23, at 56.  The list includes “justice, courage, temperance, 
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, [and] wisdom.”  Id. at 57.  And, 
Aristotle also suggests how to adapt the praise form of the epideictic oratory into the judicial setting, 
where it might be needed as the speaker (the defendant himself in the Greek setting) might be under 
suspicion.  Id. at 59–63. 
 32. Id. at 25. 
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will be less inclined to believe the good one than if it had been the only 
argument put forward, and will have reason to doubt the “goodness” and 
“fair-mindedness” of the advocate.  An advocate who is caught playing 
fast and loose with the record should not be surprised if the court 
questions his arguments.33  Likewise, a frank but appropriate concession 
or providing the court with authority contrary to your position (and 
attempting to distinguish it fairly) enhances reputation.  Answering 
hypotheticals fairly does the same.  The examples are admittedly drawn 
from appellate practice, but the ethos, pathos, and logos concepts are 
equally instructive for proper advocacy before a jury. 
At a later point in his treatise, Aristotle discusses three reasons 
(again the “rule of three!”), aside from logic, why speakers are 
persuasive, “for there are three things we trust other than logical 
demonstrations.”34  They are practical wisdom (or perhaps prudence), 
virtue (excellence),35 and good-will.36  His text again bears quoting: 
[S]peakers make mistakes in what they say or advise through [failure to 
exhibit] either all or one of these; [] for either through lack of practical 
sense they do not form opinions rightly; or though forming opinions 
rightly they do not say what they think because of a bad character; or 
they are prudent and fair-minded but lack good will, so that it is  
 
                                                     
 33. As Judge Frank Coffin explained: 
When I pick up a brief, the first thing I look for is the name of the attorney or the firm.  
This is generally a neutral exercise.  I may not know or have heard of the writer of the 
brief or the firm.  Or, if I do have some memory, it may be unilluminating.  But I must 
confess that if I associate the name with earlier briefs and arguments that were 
misleading, useless, or otherwise unreliable, I start with a special wariness.  By the same 
token, if the name recalls to me earlier candid, competent, and highly professional 
performances, I relax and prepare to enjoy the experience. 
FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 111 (1994).  
Interestingly, the venerable Judge Coffin also notes that a judge’s name can be important: 
  My next inquiry is to find out who was the judge in the trial court.  This, too, is quite 
an irrelevant quest for the most part.  Yet I cannot deny that my prior experience has 
something to do with attitude at the outset of the consideration of an appeal.  Most of the 
time, a particular trial judge would stand in my mind for an unremembered set of rulings, 
most of them sound, a few of them found reversible.  But I might remember a judge as 
the author of rulings rather consistently reversed by the appellate court.  I cannot help 
approaching an appeal from such a judge with a slight skepticism.  Finally there are trial 
judges who stand out in my mind as consistently open, sensitive, careful, and splendid.  
Here, too, I am afraid I tend to begin with a bias, predisposed to think that reversal is not 
likely. 
Id. 
 34. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 120–21. 
 35. See id. at 79 n.160 (explaining Aristotle’s use of excellence). 
 36. Id. at 121. 
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possible for people not to give the best advice although they know 
[what] it [is].37 
Although prudence and virtue are philosophic matters that the speaker 
must acquire through study and practice, good-will comes from the 
emotional aspect, the pathos. 
B. An Advocate “Stirs the Emotions” of His Audience 
Aristotle’s second means of persuasion, often called pathos, deals 
with stirring the emotions of the audience.38  “Our judgments when we 
are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and 
hostile.”39  Most of the rhetoricians of his day seemed to emphasize this 
emotive part of rhetoric to the exclusion of just about everything else.  
Aristotle realizes that “among human beings judgment is not entirely a 
rational act.  There are morally valid emotions in every situation, and it is 
part of the orator’s duty to clarify these in the minds of the audience.”40 
In Book II, Aristotle turns to the character of the audience, and how 
to understand and excite certain emotions.  These chapters have been 
termed “the earliest systematic discussion of human psychology,” and 
seek to provide the speaker with both an understanding of his audience, 
and the ability to arouse emotions in such an audience.41  These 
fascinating discussions are in positive and negative pairings, and reflect 
how little human beings have changed.  They include discussions on  
 
                                                     
 37. Id.  See also Roberts & Bywater, supra note 23, at 91 (“[O]r finally, they are both sensible 
and upright [i.e., have prudence and virtue] but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in 
consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course.”). 
 38. I want to note here that a panel of appellate judges is not the audience that a jury is. 
 39. Roberts & Bywater, supra note 23, at 25. 
 40. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 39 n.45.  Economists are coming to recognize our preferences are 
not entirely rational, perhaps witnessing what Aristotle observed so long ago.  As two economists 
explained in a recently published book: 
John Maynard Keynes sought to explain departures from full employment, and he 
emphasized the importance of animal spirits.  He stressed their fundamental role in 
businessmen’s calculations.  “Our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years 
hence of a railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an 
Atlantic liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and sometimes to 
nothing,” he wrote.  If people are so uncertain, how are decisions made?  They “can only 
be taken as a result of animal spirits.”  They are the result of “a spontaneous urge to 
action.”  They are not, as a rational economic theory would dictate, “the outcome of a 
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” 
GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES 
THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 3 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 41. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 122. 
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anger and calmness; friendliness and hostility; fear and confidence; 
shame and shamelessness. 
In chapters twelve through seventeen of Book II, Aristotle blends a 
bit of pathos and ethos as he attempts to teach the speaker how to adapt 
his character to that of the audience in order to get their attention and 
emotion.  Although some of these characterizations may seem a bit 
politically incorrect today, I want to offer a couple of them to you to 
show the technique the Great Philosopher was able to use, and to suggest 
again that studying the character of the audience and molding the 
character of the speaker are vitally important to advocacy. 
In characterizing the young, Aristotle says this: 
[T]he young are prone to desires and inclined to do whatever they 
desire.  Of the desires of the body they are most inclined to pursue that 
relating to sex, and they are powerless against this . . . .  They are 
changeable and fickle in desires, and though they intensely lust, they 
are quickly satisfied; for their wants, like the thirst and hunger of the 
sick, are sharp rather than massive . . . .  And they are impulsive and 
quick-tempered and inclined to follow up their anger [by action].  And 
they are unable to resist their impulses; for through love of honor they 
cannot put up with being belittled but become indignant if they think 
they are done a wrong . . . .  And though they love honor, they love 
victory more; for youth longs for superiority, and victory is a kind of 
superiority.42 
Oh, for the days when I was too young to resist my impulses!  But, 
compare the above with his characterizations of the old: 
People who are older and more or less past their prime have characters 
that are for the most part the opposite of these [just described]; for 
through having lived for many years and having been more often 
deceived and having made more mistakes themselves and since most 
things turn out badly, they assert nothing with certainty and all things 
with less assurance than is needed.  [] And they “think,” but do not 
“know” anything.  And being doubtful, they always add perhaps and 
maybe and say everything that way, but nothing definitively.  [] And 
they are cynical; for a cynical disposition supposes everything is for the 
worse.  Further, they are suspicious because of their distrust and 
distrustful because of experience . . . .  And they are stingy; for one of 
the necessities is money, and at the same time they know from 
experience that it is difficult to acquire and easy to lose.  [] And they 
are cowardly and fearful ahead of time about everything; for their 
disposition is the opposite of the young.  (They are chilled, but the 
young are hot, so old age has prepared the way for cowardice; for fear 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 165. 
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is a kind of chilling.)  [] And they are fond of life and more so in their 
last day because of the presence of desire for what is gone, and people 
most desire what they lack . . . .  And they expect the worst, through 
experience—[in their view] the greater part of things that happen are 
bad; at least most turn out for the worse—and through their cowardice, 
too.  [] And they live in memory more than in hope; for what is left of 
life is short, what is past is long, and hope is for the future, memory for 
what is gone.  This is the cause of their garrulity; for they keep talking 
about things that have passed; for they take pleasure in 
reminiscence . . . .  Such are the characters of the young and the older; 
as a result, since all people receive favorably speeches spoken in their 
own character and by persons like themselves, it is not unclear how 
both speakers and speeches may seem to be of this sort through use of 
words.43 
Ouch!  I have shared these paragraphs with many, and most agree they 
hit a little too close to home.  A serious student of rhetoric can mine a lot 
from this canny understanding of potential audiences. 
Advocates, I included this material both to show you the lengths 
Aristotle went to categorize and identify with his audiences and to show 
that human nature does not change all that much.  But let me specifically 
relate it to the task at hand—persuading judges whether young or old. 
Now we judges, believe it or not, prefer to do what is just (as we see 
it).  But, you are likely to get a stern rebuke, particularly from an 
appellate judge, if you appeal to “justice” standing on its own.  Keep in 
mind, an appeal to justice must be firmly grounded in the law.  In an 
appeal some months ago, a lawyer began his argument to our panel, in a 
loud voice and with a flourish, thusly: “I have come to this court to 
demand justice!”  But the presiding judge thought he had better nip this 
in the bud and get the lawyer to the real task at hand, and simply said: 
“Well, you’ve come to the wrong place then.  We do law up here.  Let’s 
talk about that.” 
C. An Advocate Presents a Logical and, Hence, Probable Argument 
The third means is logic.  Ari’s opening salvo on the means of 
persuasion often termed logos, dealing with the actual argument itself, is 
remarkably terse: “Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech 
itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the 
persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.”44  After this 
introduction he returns to the subject time and time again, for it is clearly 
                                                     
 43. Id. at 167–68. 
 44. Roberts & Bywater, supra note 23, at 25. 
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what he was, and I suggest what we should be, most concerned with.  
Now let me hurriedly say that I am not a logician; like many of you, the 
avoidance of mathematics drove me to law school.  But like all the 
experts of legal writing that I have consulted, I think logic is essential to 
the successful practice of advocacy. 
The following concepts, like the idea of concentrating on one’s 
audience, are not necessarily earth-shattering.  We use them all the time 
perhaps without intending to and certainly without telegraphing their use.  
Nonetheless, it is helpful to identify logical concepts so we have a better 
understanding of how to use them. 
The logic to be used in Ari’s rhetoric comes essentially in two forms: 
induction and deduction.45  The first is induction (also called 
“paradigmatic” reasoning, and related to reasoning by example and 
reasoning from “part to part” as in analogy).46  Inductive reasoning is a 
form of logic in which lasting, general principles are discovered from 
studying the outcomes of many small events.  Suppose that one month 
ago you gave your dog Spike a Snickers bar and he became violently ill.  
Three weeks ago you gave him some Hershey’s Kisses, and the same 
thing happened.  Last week he lost it when you gave him a Three 
Musketeers, and yesterday he projected upon receiving a Reese’s Peanut 
Butter Cup.  Using induction, you might reason that you should quit 
giving your dog chocolate, unless you are a non-risk-averse canine 
sadist, willing to be convicted of animal cruelty. 
The hard part—the real art—of inductive reasoning is knowing when 
you have found a sufficient number of examples to craft a sweeping rule.  
                                                     
 45. A third type of reasoning is “abductive” reasoning, which uses an inference to get from 
point A to point B.  Abductive reasoning does not necessarily prove anything, but rather relies on a 
logical jump from something known to something unknown (but that seems likely).  As Sherlock 
Holmes explained after using his observations of pocket-watch to correctly infer the character of its 
former owner:  
“Ah, that is good luck. I could only say what was the balance of probability.  I did not at 
all expect to be so accurate . . . .  What seems strange to you is only so because you do not 
follow my train of thought or observe the small facts upon which large inferences may 
depend.” 
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE SIGN OF FOUR 7–8 (Book-of-the-Month Club ed. 1994) (1889). 
 46. “The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example.”  EDWARD H. LEVI, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) (“‘[T]o argue by example is neither like reasoning 
from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part, 
when both particulars are subordinate to the same term and one of them is known.  It differs from 
induction, because induction starting from all the particular cases proves . . . that the major term 
belongs to the middle and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term, whereas 
argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular 
cases.’” (quoting ARISTOTLE, ANALYTICA PRIORA 69a (McKeon ed., 1941))).  Perhaps a related 
form of reasoning is abduction, in which one essentially takes a set of observed phenomena and 
forms a hypothetical explanation. 
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The number of instances of observed sickness in Spike might not be 
enough to conclude by induction that giving him chocolate will always 
make him sick.  It could be white sugar, and not chocolate, that makes 
your best friend sick.  But, I suspect that we would think our rule close 
enough for government work; even Aristotle suggests that inductive 
logic may be thought of in terms of probabilities rather than inescapable 
conclusions.47 
In law, we use inductive reasoning in several ways.  As I indicated 
above, sometimes we might use it to determine the general rule which we 
will later apply syllogistically.  Judge Aldisert shows this in his article by 
suggesting that the famous syllogism “All men are mortal; Socrates is a 
man; Therefore, Socrates is a mortal” is based upon induction.48  How do 
we know the general rule that “all men are mortal?”  Plato, Caesar, 
Washington, John Marshall, Ronald Reagan, and George Carlin were all 
men, and all mortal, therefore, we can divine a rule that all men 
eventually die.  Another example would be the reasoning in Brown v. 
Board of Education.49  The Supreme Court examined findings by various 
district courts involving specific cases, as well as sociological studies 
involving discrete samples, to determine generally that “[t]o separate 
[children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever 
to be undone.”50  Thus, the Court held that separate schools based on race 
are constitutionally impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.51 
Another example occurs in a statutory construction matter.  Suppose 
the rule is “no vehicles are allowed on the sidewalks in the park.”52  
Officer O’Brady, on a bad day perhaps, cited Ms. Murphy with a 
violation of the ordinance because she wheeled her baby carriage through 
the park.  In arguing that “vehicle” has a certain meaning, you might 
show that the ordinance has been applied to motorcycles, bicycles, 
scooters, and skateboards.  Your research might then demonstrate that no 
jurisdiction—not one—has defined baby carriages or walkers (let’s try to 
                                                     
 47. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 40–41. 
 48. Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic For Law Students: How To Think Like A Lawyer, 69 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008). 
 49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 50. Id. at 494 & nn.10–11. 
 51. Id. at 495. 
 52. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
607 (1958) (asserting that the law is affected by the “penumbra of debatable cases” in which words 
carry multiple meanings).  For a reply to Hart’s thesis, see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 662–64 (1958). 
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pick up some pathos here!) as a vehicle.  So, inductively, you would 
argue this statute could not be meant, and should not be construed, to 
apply to Ms. Murphy.53 
Although inductive reasoning has important implications for the law, 
the second category of logic, deduction (reasoning from a general to a 
particular) is really the glue that holds good advocacy together.  The 
syllogism is an example of deductive reasoning.  Understanding the 
syllogism is the most important lesson to gain from Aristotle’s three 
means of persuasion.  Remember our friend Spike the Dog.  Imagine that 
before Spike ever gets near a Snickers bar you examine some veterinary 
literature and you find a general proposition that all dogs are allergic to 
chocolate and will become violently ill if given even a small portion of it.  
You might then construct a deductive syllogism with its requisite major 
premise, minor premise, and conclusion: All dogs are allergic to 
chocolate; Spike is a dog; Spike is allergic to chocolate.  Your major 
premise—the general statement covering many cases—is that all dogs 
are allergic to chocolate.  The minor premise—a particular fact 
statement—is that good ol’ Spike is a dog.  The conclusion ineluctably 
follows if the major and minor premise are true. 
Any advocate, with a little work and practice, should be able to 
either develop enough character (or conceal it) in order to get a fair shake 
before jury, judge, judges, or justices.  Likewise, although juries are 
usually more susceptible to pathos than judges, if you studiously and 
intelligently keep the right audience in mind, you should be on equal 
footing with your adversary.  But it is in the logic of your arguments, and 
specifically your syllogisms, that you can produce overcoming advocacy. 
This is why Bryan Garner, in his excellent book, The Winning Brief, 
entitles chapter eleven as follows: “Write fair but persuasive issues that 
have only one answer.  Cast each issue as a syllogism.  If you have  
 
                                                     
 53. Or, as Professor Fuller explained, the purpose of the statute can be useful here.  If the 
purpose were to protect children from being injured by vehicles, it is not illegal for the ambulance to 
drive through the park to transport an injured child.  Fuller, supra note 52, at 663 (“It is rather 
because, for example, whether the rule be intended to preserve quiet in the park, or to save carefree 
strollers from injury, we know, ‘without thinking,’ that a noisy automobile must be excluded.”).  But 
see Hart, supra note 52, at 607 (“[I]n applying legal rules, someone must take the responsibility of 
deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with all the practical consequences 
involved in this decision.”).  In his effort to preserve the utilitarian separation of law and morals, 
Hart uses the example to concede a distinction between “core” and “penumbral” meanings of words 
(like “vehicle” in the park example).  Id. at 607–15.  Fuller, in his effort to show a deeper connection 
between law and morals, uses the example to show that we routinely consult the purpose behind 
laws in order to determine their appropriate application.  Fuller, supra note 52, at 663–69. 
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several issues, give each one a concise, neutral heading.”54  Here is his 
specific advice: 
A good issue statement generally mirrors a syllogism—the basis of all 
logical thought.  You have a major premise stating the law, a minor 
premise presenting the facts that tie into that major premise, and a 
conclusion.  But when cast as part of an issue statement, the conclusion 
becomes a question. 
 Yes, the best issues end with question marks.  Why? 
 Because a bona fide question looks and sounds objective even when 
it’s gently slanted.  Rather than pushing your answer, you’re putting a 
question on the table.  You’re also challenging your opponent to 
explain how the answer could be other than as you’re suggesting.  
You’re seizing the issue—and, as a rule, the side that successfully does 
that will win . . . .55 
So Garner gives a specific formula: the major premise is the controlling 
point of law; the minor premise is your specific factual scenario that ties 
into that legal point; and the conclusion is expressed (with some ethos 
and pathos in mind) as a question. 
Here is a very simple possible example from the recent case District 
of Columbia v. Heller,56 which re-armed our nation’s capital.  The 
District of Columbia generally prohibited the possession of handguns by 
making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and then prohibiting 
registration of handguns, subject to minor exceptions.57 
The Respondents, challenging the ordinance, might frame their 
proposition this way: 
Major Premise: The Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states in pertinent part that the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
Minor Premise: The District of Columbia’s ordinance generally 
prohibits possession of handguns, which are “arms.” 
                                                     
 54. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF 85 (2d. ed. 2004). 
 55. Id. at 86. 
 56. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 57. Id. at 2788. 
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Conclusion or Question: Does the District of Columbia’s ordinance 
violate the Second Amendment?58 
The Petitioners might proceed as follows: 
Major Premise: The Second Amendment necessarily relates the right to 
possession and bearing of arms to the existence and operation of a 
“well-regulated militia.” 
Minor Premise: The District of Columbia does not have a militia, and 
its ordinance does not restrict militia-related firearms. 
Conclusion or Question: Does the ordinance violate the Second 
Amendment?59 
This kind of reasoning pervades law and legal advocacy.  Even 
without knowing it, lawyers do much of it naturally.  Syllogisms are used 
all the time, and for good reason.  Using thoughtful and concise 
syllogisms ensures that each conclusion is buttressed with sufficient 
evidence, and gives a judge a clear trail of breadcrumbs to follow as he 
wanders through your brief. 
So in conclusion of the middle, let me remind you of a couple of 
Aristotle’s threesomes.  Speeches are of essentially three types, based 
upon the audience addressed: deliberative, judicial, or ceremonial.  The 
means of artistic persuasion—the ones unlike witnesses and torture that 
you can control—are also three: the ethos or character of the speaker, the 
emotion or pathos of the audience, and the logic or probability of the 
argument.  Good advocates think about these things. 
III. THE END: BUT REPUTATION COUNTS, TOO: AN ADVOCATE MUST 
BE ETHICAL 
In closing, let me remind you that earlier, in discussing the character 
of the speaker, I pointed out that Ari was not concerned with the previous 
reputation of the speaker in his teachings of rhetoric.  But, I said that 
there is a difference in law, and that difference is critical.  It is, in my 
view, why a center for advocacy needs to be centered at a law school, but 
must involve the active participation of the bar. 
The reputation of a legal advocate is important.  Lawyers are officers 
of the court.  Each time they argue before a judge, their reputation is at 
                                                     
 58. See id. at 2788–89. 
 59. See id. at 2789. 
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stake.  And ethical advocacy among the practicing bar is essential for 
another reason.  The bar is not only being watched by the judges; and 
judges are not only being watched by judges and the bar.  Aristotle 
focuses on how the advocate (partly because of the structure of Greek-
citizen advocacy) creates an instant reputation as he argues; Ari 
presumes that the judge or jury does not know the advocate.60 
Larry Hellman, now the Dean of the Oklahoma City University Law 
School, studied the experiences of law students who work in law offices 
while they are attending law school (as part-time interns or summer 
clerks, for example) in an influential empirical study done about twenty 
years ago.61  He found that the law students were exposed surprisingly 
frequently to serious violations of the written standards of the profession 
by lawyers, and even judges, who they encounter in their practice 
environments.  His study demonstrated that, for many students, this 
exposure to inappropriate conduct is a more powerful influence than law 
school instruction on law students’ understanding of what constitutes 
professionally appropriate conduct.62 
A chapter he has written for a forthcoming book summarizes: “This 
study demonstrated that a student’s practice environment quickly 
supersedes law school as a source of reference for demarcating 
professionally acceptable behavior.”63 
Finally, the extent of negative role-modeling encountered in law 
practices was shocking: 
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which the students in my study 
were subjected to inappropriate professional conduct that appeared to 
be condoned by those with whom they practiced.  Over 60 percent of 
the working students were exposed to at least one instance of flagrant 
professional misconduct, often within the very offices where they 
worked.  Many students saw a lawyer lie, cheat, steal, or disserve a 
client, frequently doing so as if this were ‘business as usual’ in the legal 
profession.  Perhaps the most disturbing fact to be drawn from the 
tabulation of these episodes is that the most frequently reported types of 
violations involved some of the rankest forms of professional 
                                                     
 60. MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 
58–59 (2005). 
 61. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of Law Students’ 
Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991). 
 62. Id. at 543–44. 
 63. Lawrence K. Hellman, Carnegie’s Missing Step: Prescribing Lawyer Retraining, in 
REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS (Reid Mortensen et al. eds., 2009) 
(forthcoming Dec. 2009) (citing Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the 
Formation of Law Students’ Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 537, 611 (1991)). 
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misconduct: dishonesty (29 apparent violations), breaches of 
confidentiality (19), excessive fees (21), and neglect (18).  Disregard 
for the conflict of interest rules was surprisingly widespread (40 
apparent violations).  Though fewer in number, the frequency of some 
other categories of gross misconduct is also alarming: frivolous claims 
and defenses (10 apparent violations), abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
(8), candor to tribunal (7), bribery (2), and destruction of evidence (2).  
A total of 296 apparent violations were observed by the 66 students 
who participated in the [study].  Students clearly recognized that 
compliance with the legal profession’s self-regulatory ideal was rare.64 
Dean Hellman’s study was echoed in 1992 by the influential 
MacCrate Report, published by a special task force of the American Bar 
Association.  As the report noted: 
Law schools can, and should, teach [the fundamental professional] 
values in clinical and traditional courses and should instill in students 
the desire to achieve them in the course of their professional careers.  
The efforts of the law schools, however, will mean little if the 
practicing bar shuns its own responsibilities for inculcating professional 
values.  Practicing lawyers can teach by the power of example.65 
As Judge Frank Coffin noted in his wonderful book, On Appeal, the 
most important thing in a brief may be that which is on the front page: 
the name of the advocate.66  If an advocate becomes known for the 
maladies indicted in Dean Hellman’s study, he or she may have a very 
tough row to hoe.  If the name on the brief recalls that kind of 
advocate—one known for poor writing or speaking, for denigrating 
opposing counsel, or attacking the character of the judge below—the 
brief may go to the bottom of the stack, the argument to the heel of the 
docket.67  In short, such lawyers, in addition to violating their ethical 
code, are simply forgetting Aristotle’s most important point: it’s the 
audience, stupid! 
So, in conclusion, Aristotle has taught us the importance of the 
advocate’s character and the importance of the advocate’s logical 
arguments.68  But again, the audience is the key: exhibiting character and 
                                                     
 64. Id. (citations omitted). 
 65. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION ON LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 235–36 (1992). 
 66. See COFFIN, supra note 33. 
 67. Judge Coffin is not abandoning the judge’s obligations to be fair, but is merely pointing out 
how it can be more difficult to be fair in these situations.  Id. 
 68. Roberts & Bywater, supra note 23, at 24–25. 
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reasoning crafted to the audience at hand—knowing the audience and 
doing all that you can to develop its trust. 
And that is why we are fortunate to be here.  For we are three 
ourselves: the academy, the advocates, and the audience.  The academy 
has the capacity to be an invaluable liaison between advocates and their 
primary audience, judges.  What better way for these three groups to 
teach and learn from each other, than through a center like the Shook, 
Hardy and Bacon Center for Excellence in Advocacy?  (And by the way, 
we judges need to improve our persuasive skills, too!)  This fine law 
school is fortunate to dedicate this endeavor today, and to serve not only 
as an ivory tower but also as an ivory bridge. 
